ITU Regional Radiocommunication Seminar 2024 for Asia and the Pacific (<u>RRS-24-Asia&Pacific</u>), Apia, Samoa, 16-21 September 2024

Spectrum Valuation and pricing; Economic Aspects of the Spectrum

The term pricing used in this section should be understood according to the No. 155 of the <u>ITU Constitution and Convention</u> (published in Basic Texts, 2023).

Thursday 19/09: Session 2 (10H00 -11H00, local time):

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Not all slides will be presented



Geneva, October 2007 ITU Radio Assembly

Roles of the National Spectrum Management (1)

https://mazar.atwebpages.com/Downloads/ITU_RRS22AsiaSpectrumManagementMazarKeyNotePresentationFiji19Dec22.pdf

- 1. Follow RR Allocations
- 2. Reduce interference: lower-power, lower-altitude Above Sea Level, lower-altitude Above Ground Level
- 3. No discrimination; fairness, transparency & efficiency
- 4. Market-Dynamics: Intervene only when market-failure: lack of competition
- Unused RF is a waste to economy: there is available RF: due to digital-dividends more RF than cellular competitors. Balanced annual-fees will avoid unproper auction results.
- 6. For cellular efficient usage, consider to oblige active RF sharing
- Efficient use of spectrum: assign spectrum to those that will generate the greatest socio-economic benefit from its use
- 8. Promote investment and innovation in the sector
- 9. New technologies improve b/Hz/second

10. Convergence of mobile, fixed, broadcasting and Internet services

11.Try not to allocate RF when the Transmitter & the Receiver are fixed

12. Emphasize 'Caveat Emptor': a Latin phrase "let the buyer beware."



Roles of National Spectrum Management (2)

- 1. Avoid and solve interference
- 2. Design long and short term RF spectrum
- 3. Support Engineering: propagation, coverage...
- Use APT Frequency Information System <u>http://www.aptafis</u>.org/; it is similar to European ECO Frequency Information System <u>https://efis</u>.cept.org/
- 5. Coordinate with other Administrations; like European Frequency Co-ordination Agreement European <u>HCM-Agreement</u>
- 6. Use the ITU tools developed for <u>GEO6 Agreement</u>, for analogue to digital switch off
- 7. Coordinate with military wireless applications
- 8. Advance new wireless technologies (such as cognitive radios; digital audio and video)

- 9. Advance new technologies and efficient import
- 10. Serve your clients, the public: be transparent
- 11. Reduce RF human hazards, by providing more RF to cellular Operators (see slide)





Mobile-cellular telephone subscriptions per 100 inhabitants, 2010-2023

this and the following three slides are based on See <u>https://www.itu.int/en/ITU-D/Statistics/Pages/stat/default.aspx</u>; retrieved 16 September 2024;

Cellular is most significant wireless application (safety of life, e-Health, social life) to be well treated by regulators







2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021 2022 2023



Mobile-cellular per 100 inhabitants, 2000-2021; world-average vs Fiji





Mobile-cellular per 100 inhabitants, See https://www.itu.int/ en/ITU-D/Statistics/Pages/st at/default.aspx Retrieved on 16 September 2024



<u>Report ITU-R SM.2012-6</u> (06/2018) 'Economic aspects of spectrum management'

- 1. Strategies for economic approaches to national spectrum management and their financing
- 2. Assessment, for spectrum planning and strategic development purposes, of the benefits arising from the use of the radio spectrum
- 3. Alternative methods of national spectrum management





Consumer and producer surplus; <u>https://www.itu.int/pub/R-REP-</u> <u>SM.2012-6-2018</u> (Fig1) and source <u>UK report 2012</u> Fig. B.1



The pricing formula and parameters (1)

For all services, it is an opportunity cost and Administered Incentive Pricing (AIP) fee formula, represented by the following general, simple, functional and linear (with bandwidth) form:

$$\operatorname{Cost} = \alpha \times F \times B \times \rho \times \sigma \times l \times M_{pub} \qquad \frac{\operatorname{Cost}}{B} = \alpha \times F \times \rho \times \sigma \times l \times M_{pub}$$

Dividing the two parts of the equation by the bandwidth B, the following fee formula per MHz is obtained:

Except Cost unit in the national currency (cur), α (cur/MHz) and *B* (MHz), all except cost unit are in the national currency (cur), α (cur/MHz) and *B* (MHz), all parameters serve as modifiers

The Model determines the fees only for transmitters; i.e. VSAT earth stations operators pay only for their transmitters' bandwidth; FM and TV receivers don't pay spectrum utilization fee (SUF). 12

Next slide indicates the definitions of all parameters:



The pricing formula and parameters (2)

Cost (cur): spectrum cost in national currency

B (MHz): total assigned bandwidth

 α (cur/MHz): basic price unit. Based on the market dynamics, the country's vision of the ICT sector and international best practice. α is the value of 1 MHz for cellular service below 6 000 MHz

F: depends solely on centre frequency; *F* equals 1 for frequencies below 6 000 MHz and 6 000/f for higher frequencies. *F* is uncorrelated to the service

 ρ : regional factor; equals 1 for national license, and proportional (less than 1) to the number of administrative areas (regions, provinces) covered by non-national license

 σ : operator's sharing factor; equals to one for exclusive RF. As two or more operators may share the same RF, particularly, point to point (PtP) links, σ might be less than 1; 1/2 for two users sharing same RF, 1/3 for three, etc.

l: site location: urban or rural (site outside the urban area) areas. It defines the socio-economic development within different districts and classifies different fees. *l* may get two values, e.g. full price in urban; 25% full price in rural areas. Administrations may decide other value, or provide additional classes like remote, etc.

 M_{pub} : The public moderator to takes into account a differentiation among services. M_{pub} actually defines the fees. M_{pub} equals 1 for the cellular service. For other services, M_{pub} numbers are arbitrary and predetermine the annual cost of the service. For example, for free-to-air television M_{pub} may be significantly lower. M_{pub} serves as framework for holding the values of different services.

The specific values of α , l and M_{pub} are subjective and defined by the regulator.

This factor could be excluded in case of agreements among operators on spectrum sharing, under the provisions of national regulations; see Report ITU-R <u>SM.2404</u> – Regulatory tools to support enhanced shared use of the spectrum. The fees should be related to the **propagation characteristics** (less obstacles higher-price) of the **frequencies** (higher RF lower-price) and **site location** (more population-density, higher-price); Higher RF – lower fees, for all services; see next-page figure.

Relative fees (coefficient F) depend on frequency





Proposed Point 2 Point coefficient F as function of RF









Auctions- Strategies

- 1. Consult with stakeholders on RF pricing, before implementing the proposed pricing models
- 2. Auctions define the true value per MHz of RF spectrum
- 3. if RF supply is higher than demand; there is no urgent need to advance Auctions, as it wouldn't advance straightforwardly the wireless communications and rural coverage





Low exposure thresholds by additional sites & RF Spectrum; simplistic equations; see Mazar Wiley book 2016 revised 2021 section 9.6.3

For a given network (technology, number of sites, RF spectrum, quality of service), better coverage is achieved by transmitting at higher effective power (for both downlink and uplink channels), installing base stations at higher altitude above ground level (less signal attenuation) and using lower radio frequency.

Max. channel capacity for each communications link in a given network is derived from Shannon Hartley monumental paper (**Shannon 1948 p.43**, **theorem 17**), relating <u>capacity (bit/s)</u>, RF <u>b</u>andwidth (Hz) and the <u>signal to n</u>oise (dimensionless) ratio; ultimate Shannon data rate :

$$c = b \times \log_2\left(1 + s / n\right)$$

Moreover, in urban scenario s/n is small. LTE RSRQ (Reference Signal Received Quality) quantifies the capacity; UE measures this parameter as reference signal. Values higher than -9dB guarantee the best subscriber experience; the range between -9 and -12dB can be seen as neutral with a slight degradation of Quality of Service. So for s/n very small relative to 1; Using Taylor series expansion of a function about 0: Maclaurin series, thus:

$$c = b \times \log_2 (1 + s / n) \approx b \times \frac{s / n}{\ln 2} \approx 1.44 \times b \times s / n$$

Therefore, staying with the same *capacity c*- less base-stations (reduced *signal*) can be compensated by more frequency *band* (*b*). The capacity is limited by power *s* & noise density *n*_o.

Cellular capacity is limited by power & noise; adding RF to base stations decreases the number of BSs. More RF for a specific site doesn't 20 necessarily increase EMF around BS.

Around active RF shared BSs the EMF increases! This file doesn't analyse the total EMF derived from active sharing, as it depends on technologies and based on the cellular planning.



Additional Mazar files on Spectrum Valuation and pricing; Economic Aspects of the Spectrum

- 1. 'Economic Environment' including these sections 'Economic Valuation of the RF spectrum', 'National Cost Accounting: the RF Spectrum as an Non-Produced Asset', 'Fee Policy', 'Different Types of Auctions' and 'Determining the Annual-Fees' in his Wiley 2016 book '<u>Radio Spectrum Management: Policies, Regulations, Standards and Techniques</u>'
- 2. The <u>Radio Spectrum Management: Policies, Regulations, Standards and Techniques</u>' models of the RF fees are implemented in Bhutan
- 3. The formulas this presentation <u>slide</u> are documented in ATDI's <u>contributions to ITU</u>: 'proposed revision of report ITU-R_<u>SM.2012</u> 'Economic aspects of spectrum management' document <u>1B/205</u>, 13 Nov. 2017. See <u>SM.2012-6</u> (06/2018) section 4.8 'Opportunity cost and administrative incentive pricing: simple, functional and linear equations'
- 4. Recruited by ITU to conduct on 30 Sept.–4 Oct. 2019 a mission in Zambia '<u>Auctioning Training & Technical</u> <u>Assistance</u>'
- 5. Original presentation in Zanzibar Workshop, on 3 March 2020 Zanzibar2_March2020_SpectrumUseEfficiencyEconomicValue&Refarming_Mazar.pdf

